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ABSTRACT. In the early hours of 25 December 2012, an attempt to explore Subglacial Lake Ellsworth,
West Antarctica, using a specially designed hot-water drill, was halted. This UK project, involving
several universities, the British Antarctic Survey and the National Oceanography Centre, had been in
planning for 10 years. The project developed a full blueprint for subglacial lakes research, involving
access to the subglacial environment through deep drilling, direct measurement and sampling of water
and sediment by the construction of a probe and sediment corer, and environmental protocols to ensure
cleanliness in line with international agreements on stewardship and protection of subglacial systems.
Drilling was ceased after the main borehole failed to link with a subsurface cavity of water, built up over
40 hours. Without this link, insufficient water was available to continue drilling downwards to the
lake, 3000m beneath the surface. On return to the UK, an external review of the programme was
undertaken to formally assess the reasons for the fieldwork failure, and to make recommendations on
the modifications necessary for success. From this review, the Lake Ellsworth programme formulated a
pathway along which a second attempt to explore the lake can be developed. Here details of the Lake
Ellsworth field experiment, the circumstances that led to its failure and the corrections required are
presented. Hot-water drilling is still regarded as the only feasible scheme for assuring clean access to the
subglacial environment. The lessons learned from the Lake Ellsworth experience are substantial,
however, and demonstrate that considerable technological and methodological advances are necessary
for successful future research on subglacial lakes beneath thick (>2 km) ice.
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geophysics, subglacial lakes
1. BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION
Although subglacial lakes were first discovered >40 years
ago as a consequence of the measurement of the ice-sheet
bed by long-range airborne radio-echo sounding (RES)
(Robin, 1969; Oswald and Robin, 1973; Robin and others,
1977), it was not until the measurement of Lake Vostok’s
(Antarctica) dimensions (Ridley and others, 1993; Kapitsa
and others, 1996) that broad scientific interest in them was
established. The specific information that led to this change
concerned the identification through seismic sounding of
Lake Vostok’s water depth at >500m (Kapitsa and others,
1996), making it one of the world’s top ten largest lakes.
Accompanying the publication of this finding were two
evaluations of its potential significance. First, Bentley (1996)
showed the physical processes controlling how the lake may
have formed, by melting at the ice base and accumulation
of water within basal topography, which though applied to
Lake Vostok could be generalized over much of the ice-
sheet base. Second, Ellis-Evans and Wynn-Williams (1996)
hypothesized that the lake could be a viable habitat for life,
and speculated about the forms and concentrations of
microorganisms that might exist there. In the same year, a
new inventory of subglacial lakes, as recorded by RES, was
compiled (Siegert and others, 1996), revealing stored water
at the bed of much of the Antarctic ice sheet. In combin-
ation, these papers led to a sudden appreciation that the
Antarctic ice-sheet base likely contains a significant, diverse
and isolated habitat for microorganisms. To develop this
scientific interest, four international workshops were held in
the 1990s (Cambridge, UK 1994; St Petersburg, Russia
1998; Washington DC, USA 1998; and Cambridge, UK
1999). At these meetings, the notion of sediments at the
floors of subglacial lakes as potential recorders of past ice-
sheet and climate change was discussed (P. Barrett,
unpublished information). Thus, by the end of the 1990s,
two scientific hypotheses regarding life in subglacial lakes
and climate records in lake-floor sediments had emerged.
As these hypotheses are testable by direct measurement and
sampling of subglacial lakes, attention turned to how and
when these environments could be accessed.
By the turn of the century, although there was inter-
national agreement that direct measurement and sampling
of subglacial lakes was warranted to test the two scientific
hypotheses, little consensus existed on how and where such
work should take place. Convergence of views among the
scientific community was assisted by a number of events and
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reports, which greatly assisted the development and plan-
ning of subsequent subglacial lake exploration programmes.
The timeline of these activities is as follows. In 2000, the
Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) con-
vened a group of specialists named SALE (Subglacial
Antarctic Lake Environments) as a forum for scientists and
technologists to discuss how subglacial lake exploration
might take place. In 2004, this committee transformed into
one of SCAR’s scientific research programmes. By 2005, a
new inventory revealed evidence for 145 Antarctic sub-
glacial lakes, spread across the continent (Siegert and others,
2005). This was followed by evidence from satellite altim-
etry demonstrating hydrological connections between sub-
glacial lakes (Wingham and others, 2006; Fricker and others,
2007), leading to an appreciation that subglacial hydrology
was far more dynamic in Antarctica than had been generally
appreciated previously. In 2006, in advance of the Inter-
national Polar Year, SCAR SALE convened a workshop in
Grenoble, France, to further advance international agree-
ment on scientific plans and technology. A year later, as part
of an independent assessment of subglacial lakes research,
the US National Academies published a review on these
plans from an environmental and conservation perspective
(NRC, 2007). This review was debated, in the light of
emerging scientific proposals to undertake subglacial lake
access, at an international meeting in Baltimore, USA
(Siegert and others, 2011). From these advances, debates
and reviews, SCAR built a code of conduct on subglacial
lake exploration, which was agreed by the Antarctic Treaty
Consultative Meeting (ATCM; in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in
2011), providing guiding principles on how direct measure-
ment and sampling of subglacial lake systems should be
undertaken in a manner that would preserve them, and their
surroundings, as pristine environments.
Planning to undertake direct measurement and sampling
of Subglacial Lake Ellsworth began in 2002, through a series
of UK-wide meetings that progressed thinking on the
technology required and the science that might be achieved.
These plans were informed by the international debates
taking place at the same time (primarily via SCAR), and
indeed fed back into the broader debates on subglacial
aquatic environments. The first issue considered concerned
the subglacial lake best suited for exploration. Siegert (2002)
analysed individual details of the 77 subglacial lakes known
at the time (Siegert and others, 1996), in order to determine
which were the most suitable for exploration in the first
instance. The result was a set of criteria that SCAR SALE
employed to develop an international plan for subglacial
lake exploration (Priscu and others, 2003). Based on these
criteria, Siegert (2002) concluded that relatively small
subglacial lakes in West Antarctica would likely be most
appropriate. As the inventory of lakes increased to 145
(Siegert and others, 2005), Siegert and others (2004) showed
how one lake, Subglacial Lake Ellsworth, matched the
criteria well. Based on a single airborne geophysical transect
(Drewry and Meldrum, 1978), which defined the lake by
flat, bright radio-echo sounding reflections, they showed
that the lake was 10 km in length, 3 km beneath the ice
and, judging by the side-wall slopes at the edge of the lake,
was likely to be more than 10m deep, possibly much
deeper. While this information gave confidence in Lake
Ellsworth being a good target for exploration, it was
insufficient to build a proposal for exploration, given that
the precise dimensions of the lake, including its depth and
topographic setting, were not known. To solve this, a
dedicated geophysical survey of the lake was conducted in
2007/08 and 2008/09, involving ground-based RES to
determine the outline of the lake, the nature of the
surrounding topography and information about the inputs
and outputs of water to the lake, and seismic sounding to
measure the water depth and evidence for sub-lake sedi-
ments. The survey was very successful, and resulted in an
unprecedented resolution of data over a subglacial lake
system (Woodward and others, 2010).
Lake Ellsworth is located within an overdeepened section
of a subglacial topographic valley, within the Ellsworth
Subglacial Highlands (Siegert and others, 2012), and
20 km from the ice divide (Fig. 1). Based on known
geomorphological processes, it is likely the trough forma-
tion pre-dates the current ice sheet (Ross and others, 2014),
most likely being incised by an outlet glacier flowing from a
small, dynamic ice cap centred over the highlands, possibly
in a fjord-like setting when much of present-day West
Antarctica was covered by the sea. The lake is 14.7 km long,
with an area of 28.9 km2, and exists beneath 3280–
2930m of ice (Woodward and others, 2010). Narrow
(generally <1.5 km) in its up-ice third, the lake broadens
(>3.05 km), before narrowing into a small embayment in its
lowermost 2.5 km. The down-ice limit of the topographic
overdeepening is marked by a 6 km-long ridge with a
200m relief, which crosses the entire width of the trough.
This ridge is above the elevation of the adjoining lake, and
likely plays a key role in controlling the lake drainage. Lake
Ellsworth can therefore be considered as a ‘topographically
controlled’ subglacial lake, making it potentially insensitive
to glacial–interglacial ice-sheet changes (Ross and others,
2011a). The depth and bathymetry of Lake Ellsworth was
established from seismic reflection data (Woodward and
others, 2010), revealing it to have a water volume of
1.4 km3 (Woodward and others, 2010) and a maximum
lake depth of 156m. Analysis of the seismic data indicates
the lake bed is composed of high-porosity, low-density
sediments, similar to material found on the deep ocean
floor, and indicative of deposition in a low-energy environ-
ment (Ross and others 2011a; Siegert and others, 2012). The
sediment is at least 2m thick, and there is no evidence for
consolidation by overriding ice. This latter finding adds
confidence that the lake is an ancient stable system as,
conceptually, it would likely take several hundred thousand
years to accumulate >2m of sediment (Bentley and others,
2011), and, in the absence of the lake, for the ice sheet to
over-compact the sediments.
First results on the lake’s water depth were issued from the
field at the start of 2008. In the previous 4 years, the
technological and cleanliness requirements for lake access,
measurement and sampling had been defined. Importantly, a
precise location for lake access was determined, being a
location which best optimized the programme’s scientific
potential (Woodward and others, 2010). Consequently, the
exploration of Lake Ellsworth was able to be formally
proposed in early 2008, with funding granted by the UK
Natural Environment Research Council (NERC) in December
that year. As plans took shape, a comprehensive environ-
mental evaluation (CEE) of the programme was submitted to
the Committee on Environmental Protection (part of the
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting) in Buenos Aires in
June 2011, which was subsequently modified in light of
comments received and submitted to the same committee a
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year later. Following a supportive response from the ATCM
in Hobart in 2012, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth
Office issued the British Antarctic Survey (BAS) with a permit
to conduct the fieldwork in the early summer of 2012.
Details of the Lake Ellsworth experiment, including the
environmental considerations and mitigation strategies, are
summarized briefly below and are available in Siegert and
others (2012).
The aim of this paper is to explain the reasons why the
fieldwork failed to achieve its target of lake entry, and to
present how the problems encountered can be rectified for
future research at Lake Ellsworth and, indeed, in other deep
(>2 km) subglacial environments. We now know of >350
Antarctic subglacial lakes (Wright and Siegert, 2012). While
several of these would make compelling targets under the
criteria established by Siegert (2002), the knowledge of Lake
Ellsworth’s dimensions, and topographic and glaciological
settings, which is essential to configuring plans for its direct
measurement and sampling, continue to make it an
outstanding candidate for exploration.
2. EXPERIMENT DESIGN
The programme’s plan was to access the lake using a
bespoke deep hot-water drill to melt a clean hole from the
ice surface to the lake, through which a clean probe would
be deployed to take measurements and samples of the water,
followed by a clean percussion corer to acquire lake-floor
sediments (Siegert and others, 2012). Cleanliness protocols
needed to be developed, to ensure a negligible level of
contamination (i.e. well below our ability to measure it) to
the lake during the experiment, as did assurance on the issue
of potential gas exchange between the lake and ice surface
upon lake entry (Brito and others, 2013).
The hot-water drill design was centred on a single
1.5MW boiler, which fed hot water into two hoses
(Fig. 2). First, a 340m umbilical hose was used to create a
hole 300m deep, at which point a reservoir of water was
created. As the top 70m of the ice sheet is permeable,
drilling through this layer required substantial water storage
at the ice-sheet surface. This water was created by melting
snow into three 30 000 L tanks, using power from the boiler
via a discrete circulation system. Once below 70m, the
pump on the umbilical could be activated, to pass water
back to the surface and avoid further loss of water to the ice
sheet. Upon creation of the subsurface reservoir, a second
(main) hole was created through a 3400m single length of
hose. Using water held within both the surface tanks and
subsurface reservoir, initial water loss in the upper 70m was
not anticipated as a major problem. The main hole needed
to link into the subsurface cavity before further drilling to the
lake. This was necessary to recirculate water to the surface
and to regulate the water level of the main borehole prior to
lake entry; a hydrological head 284m below the ice
surface was required to equilibrate the borehole and lake
water pressures, to ensure minimal exchange between the
two upon the moment of access.
Cleanliness was assured by the following series of
measures. First, all the water used to drill the holes was
passed through a 0.1mm filter to remove particles and
radiated with strong ultraviolet (UV) light (254 nm, 200W)
to kill any remaining microorganisms. Second, all the hoses
were wiped with ethanol prior to their descent in the ice
sheet. Third, the main hole was airlocked, and the upper
air-filled component was radiated by UV light through a
specially designed probe. Fourth, all the probes and corers
were built in ultra-sterile conditions, and transported to the
ice sheet in robust bags. Fifth, a deployment system was
Fig. 1. (a) The location of Lake Ellsworth (shown as an asterisk)
superimposed against an interferometric synthetic aperture radar
(InSAR) surface ice velocity map of the region (green represents
lower velocities, purple corresponds to higher velocities) and the
ice surface elevation (contours are in 50m intervals). Adapted from
Siegert and others (2004). (b) Three-dimensional view of the surface
extent of Subglacial Lake Ellsworth, and its surrounding topography.
Numerous glacial geological features are noted, which collectively
demonstrate that the landscape in this region has been heavily
influenced by the erosive action of dynamic upland glaciation pre-
dating the slow-flowing existing ice cover. Ice flow is approximately
along the axis of the trough (Ross and others, 2011b). Adapted from
Ross and others (2011a) and Siegert and others (2012).
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configured, using a series of airlocks formed from glove
hatches and seals, cleaned with hydrogen peroxide vapour,
to ensure the probes could be placed within the clean hole,
and extracted from it, without exposure to the atmosphere.
The drilling procedure was calculated to allow the main
hole to be 36 cm wide upon deployment of the probe. This
procedure required the rate of drill descent and the water
temperature to be controlled to match the calculated profile.
To ensure this, measurements of water temperature, winch
load and drill descent rate were configured to be available to
the drilling engineer.
It is interesting to note similarities and differences
between the configuration of the Lake Ellsworth experiment
and that of two other Antarctic subglacial lake programmes.
The first is a Russian experiment to access Subglacial Lake
Vostok, a >500m deep lake beneath 3750m of ice in East
Antarctica (Lukin and Bulat, 2011). While this programme
has implemented a comprehensive environmental evalu-
ation for discussion at the ATCM, its preferred use of the
Vostok ice-core hole, positioned over the southern extreme
of the lake, has been controversial. This is because the hole
is filled with kerosene drilling fluid, making assurances on
cleanliness and sterility challenging. Nonetheless, in early
February 2012 Russian ice corers successfully accessed the
lake, after drilling fluid was observed overtopping the core
hole (i.e. water from the lake pushed into the core hole upon
entry of the drill). Russian colleagues are currently examin-
ing water samples collected through this activity, and plans
are being devised to use the access hole to deploy
equipment into the lake, in order to take direct measurement
and samples. The second is a US-led programme, to explore
Subglacial Lake Whillans, Siple Coast, West Antarctica
(Fricker and others, 2011). A similar drilling procedure to
that configured for Lake Ellsworth was successfully used to
Fig. 2. Schematic diagram showing the set-up of the Lake Ellsworth hot-water drill system. H = heaters; P = pumps; F = filters. From Brito and
others (2012b).
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penetrate and sample the lake in January 2013. As the lake is
shallow (<2m at the drill site, beneath 800m of ice) and
probably ephemeral (Fricker and others, 2007), a compre-
hensive environmental evaluation was not considered
necessary, reducing the requirement to undertake the work
in ultra-sterile conditions.
3. FIELDWORK DIARY FOR DECEMBER 2012
The hot-water drilling system was configured and its
function tested in Cambridge between 2009 and 2011. It
was designed to fit within a series of 20 ISO (International
Standards Organization) shipping containers, to allow
portability and ease of use within the field. In November
2011, some of the heavy items (boiler, hoses and winch
containers) were transported to the Lake Ellsworth location
and stored for overwintering. In November of the following
year, the lake probes and scientific equipment were
delivered to the site with eight engineers and technicians
from BAS and the National Oceanography Centre (NOC),
who began assembling the equipment, ready for commence-
ment of the experiment in December 2012. On 1 December,
four scientists joined the team at Lake Ellsworth, including
principal investigator (PI) Martin Siegert, to provide general
assistance to the experiment (i.e. manual labour such as
snow shovelling) and to take control on scientific matters
related to the probe deployments and sample retrieval.
The following text is taken from an abridged version of
the PI’s field diary, which records the events and issues faced
by the field team between 1 and 25 December 2012.
Though it is an abbreviated and subjective record, it was
used to describe the fieldwork by Lake Ellsworth’s formal
self-evaluation to the NERC Failure Review Board, as
discussed in Section 4.
1 December
Martin Siegert, Martyn Tranter, Dominic Hodgson and David
Pearce (programme scientists) arrive on site. Rest of the SLE
[Subglacial Lake Ellsworth] team (Chris Hill – programme
manager and expedition leader; Andy Tait & Andy Webb –
drilling engineers; and Ed Waugh & Robin Brown – NOC
probe/instrument deployment engineers; Riet van de Velde
– Camp Manager; Scott Iremonger – plant mechanic;
Pete Bucktrout – BAS Cameraman) have been working for
the last three weeks. The field site is set up [as illustrated in
Figs 3 and 4] and checks and tests are about to begin.
2 December
Digging the well head of the main borehole. An auger used
to drill to 4–5m, and the main well head is installed and
linked to the deployment containers’ rails.
3 December
Drill system: Minor problem reported; load cells not
working, otherwise OK. [Down-hole] Instruments: All OK
bar the downward looking camera on the percussion corer.
4–5 December
Testing the probe deployment system [Fig. 5a].
5 December
Bad news. Boiler Control Panel fails upon switch on. No
idea why this happened. But the container was not at the
boiler operating temperature when switch on occurred. This
is our best explanation for the failure. Replacement board
used, not activated. Spare board ordered from the suppliers,
will take 10 days to arrive.
6 December
More boiler issues. Various valves cracked, and pressurisa-
tion system not working properly due to faulty gauges. It
appears the boiler had not liked the winter, and was
probably not properly conditioned to face the winter. ‘Work
arounds’ found for these ailments, but not ideal.
7 December
Drill system OK: load cells still not working though. Probe
deployment testing going well. Day and night shifts being
organised.
8 December
Saturday. Using the weekend to get some rest ahead of
drilling on Monday, and to adjust to night shifts. Final
preparations around the drill site.
9 December
Final briefing before tomorrow’s drilling. Run through health
and safety and first aid & medical procedures. Spill kit
awareness is discussed and noted. Everyone in the camp
must now carry a radio for comms.
10–11 December
Boiler switch on process. Boiler being filled. Lots of
shovelling snow into the onion tanks. More minor problems
with the pressurisation pumps, this time frozen again. Boiler
being warmed for 24 hours.
Boiler turned on 0800 11 December; this time control
board responds well. Some queries over an error message,
resolved after satellite phone call with the manufacturer.
Boiler activated 0900 11 December.
11–12 December
Shovelling snow into onion tanks; 2 30000 litres.
0700 12th. Boiler is very smoky; Andy Tait to phone
manufacturer for solution. Probably to do with altitude
difference compared with Cambridge, where it was com-
missioned.
1700 12th. Boiler now working well. Second tank now
full. Ready for drilling the cavity hole.
13 December
0030. Boiler seems to be running hot, and apparently
burning material on its exterior.
0550. Umbilical hose connected to the second well head.
0730. Cat pumps and filters being primed.
1650. Umbilical drilled for 60m, but was losing too
much water so was halted. Drill nozzle was bent in the
process [Fig. 4b]. Various minor ailments with the boiler
required phone calls with suppliers. The onion tanks need to
be refilled with water, but no immediate rush.
14 December
0040. Snow shovelling. Ed Waugh calculating the loss of
water in onion tanks due to evaporation; loss of water at
2–3 cm per day in agreement with this idea, so no major
leaks in the tanks.
2215. Various boiler issues have been resolved, or
‘worked around’.
Siegert and others: Lessons from the Lake Ellsworth field season 2012/13 63
2240. However, pressurisation sensors broken, as are the
seals on the pressure pumps.
15 December
0215. Working all night to extract the pumps to examine.
0520. After 3 hours of examination, the pumps simply
needed tightening, due to ice expansion. We’re confident of
the fix, as we did a thorough strip down and test.
1035. Steps backwards. The pressure sensors on the boiler
don’t work, and so we’re tricking the system to start up.
1045. Smoke from the boiler stack; good news that it’s
running again, albeit smokey. Planning to commence
drilling after lunch.
1600. Very bad news. The second control board has
failed, this time more catastrophically than before [Fig. 4c].
Discussions on whether we can cannibalise from the two
boards. No is the answer.
Even if the replacement board came, it may fail too.
Everyone rather saddened and depressed by this situation.
Thoughts on failure. The component that failed was a
varistor; a variable resistor. This is supposed to protect the
system from spikes on the power feed. Thought 1. Winter-
isation. The board may not have liked the cold winter temps.
Thought 2. Power surge; thought possible but would mean
our generators are not behaving aswewouldwish. Thought 3.
Faulty component. At this point the programme looks off.
16 December
0440. Agreed to wait for 3rd control board to arrive.
0900. Andy Tait phoning the burner manufacturer. Import-
antly the failure took place at the start of drilling, and so we
have enough fuel for a restart. Decided to keep ticking things
over, although this will cost fuel. The boiler manufacturer will
need to instruct us on how to programme the control board.
Fig. 3. Schematic layout of the field camp. Taken from Siegert and others (2012).
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1830. Winch load cells still not working; Ed Waugh to
take a look at. Fuel still available for a full deployment, but
now too low to have a full second deployment. Replacement
control board now at Santiago: could have it on site on 20th.
17 December
1715. After lengthy calls, we found out the two failed
control boards had faulty varistors, which had apparently
failed on other burner control units. The replacement is from
a new batch. While this makes faulty component the most
likely explanation it doesn’t rule out the power spike issue,
so we are being careful with the generators and power use.
18–20 December
Things ticking over waiting for the new board; needing to
keep 60 000 litres of water warm is costing fuel. Topping up
onion tanks with snow to maintain their levels (loss due to
evaporation according to Ed Waugh’s calculations on
14 December).
1645 20th. Illyushin flight to ALE [Antarctic Logistics
and Expeditions] and Twin Otter flight to SLE with new
control board.
21 December
Fitting the new control board onto the burner.
1150. Efforts to restart the boiler are difficult. LCD screen
also failed previously. Replaced with original screen (from
first failed burner unit). All programming deleted; needs
manual loading via satellite link with suppliers in the UK
(Fig. 5d).
1840. Boiler on and working OK. Care being taken on
loading/unloading the electricity use, as we still don’t know
that large electricity spike wasn’t responsible for previous
board failure.
22 December
1735. Drilling recommences. Boiler working well. But not at
full power yet, due to temperature requirement of the
umbilical (pump works <408C). Bent nozzle on the
umbilical again. Removed and restarted.
2200. 300 m reached; drilling paused and cavity starts to
be built.
23 December
Main hose is connected to the well head. Main drilling
commences at 1620.
1945. Suddenly, everything stops. Generator has short
circuited, and caused shut down in all the others. All is
eerily quiet. One of the generators has failed and cannot be
restarted. We can run on 2 generators, but this is a stretch
(90% of their capacity now needed 100% of time). We have
no choice, however.
2200. The short circuit blew the control board on the
boiler for third time. This time, however, the varistor did its
job and routed the spike to the fuse, which blew. Fuse
replaced and boiler on again.
2200. Drilling restarts.
24 December
Drilling continues but is slow progress.
0400. 7 m above the level of the cavity. Pausing.
0600. We believe the umbilical and main boreholes may
be linked, as water loss from main borehole is matched by
water pumped from cavity.
0750. The boiler cannot get to the required temperature
of 908C. It stalls at 708C, which means we cannot get to the
lake surface as it stands, according to Keith Makinson’s new
calculation emailed from Cambridge.
0825. Calls to the boiler suppliers again, to see if settings
can be changed.
1540. Good news. Boiler is running up to temperature
and is good to go.
90 000 litres of water, 3 full onion tanks, on surface
available now for use.
1540. Bad news. The main hole re-reamed and major
water loss was observed. Our supposed borehole connec-
tion was misread. More (frantic) shovelling to replenish
water loss. Now continue searching for cavity.
1800. Still no cavity connection, everyone exhausted but
continuing to shovel. Umbilical is stuck in the ice. It is either
Fig. 4. Aerial photograph of the Lake Ellsworth field camp. Taken on 1 December 2012. Courtesy of Peter Bucktrout, NERC British Antarctic
Survey.
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Fig. 5. (a) Probe deployment system being tested above the well head. In this photograph, the probe (in this case a UV probe, designed to
sterilize the upper portion of the dry borehole) is connected to the well head by a glove box, which is wrapped in a thermal blanket and is
being cleaned by exposure to hydrogen peroxide vapour. Once cleaned, the probe could be transferred to the borehole via the lower and
upper glove-box compartments (for details of this procedure see Siegert and others, 2012). Photograph taken by M. Siegert. (b) Photograph of
the drill nozzle extension that was bent while drilling the first borehole via the umbilical hose. Photograph taken by M. Siegert. (c) Hot-water
drill boiler circuit board revealing two catastrophic component failures (circled in red). Courtesy of Peter Bucktrout, NERC British Antarctic
Survey. (d) Drill engineers Andy Webb and Andy Tait programming the replacement boiler control board via satellite phone link to the
manufacturer in the UK (on 24 December 2012). Courtesy of Peter Bucktrout, NERC British Antarctic Survey.
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jammed or frozen in. Likeliest explanation is that water
wicked down the pipe from the overflowing main hose. This
would explain why initially the water loss was negligible,
but severe afterwards. Water can be seen at 40 m from the
surface, so pooling over the frozen section.
25 December
0030. Drilling is ceased. Even if we did link the cavity and
release the umbilical, the delays have meant we no longer
have enough fuel to continue to the lake surface (at least
73 hours of drilling needed if cavity is connected now). In
addition we are exhausted with shovelling. The decision was
difficult to make but easy enough to call. Hot water being
poured into umbilical to release it.
0450. Packing up has started already. Attempts to lift the
umbilical with 3 tonnes of force failed. It is stuck.
1200. We are forced to cut the umbilical. A very bad day.
Everyone resigned to events. Now discussing how the main
drill failed to connect to the cavity.
4. PROGRAMME FAILURE REVIEW BOARD
Following cessation of fieldwork, the scientific team were
uplifted from Lake Ellsworth, back to Rothera station
between 27 and 30 December, and to the UK early in the
new year. The engineers and technicians remained at Lake
Ellsworth to pack up the equipment, ready for its transport
back to Union Glacier. The boiler, probes and scientific
equipment were transferred from Union Glacier to Punta
Arenas, Chile, from where they were shipped back to the UK
(by May 2013). The winches, pumps and other containers
were held at Union Glacier ready for transfer back to the UK
in the following season.
Once back in the UK, attention among the programme’s
scientific leaders focused on understanding why the Lake
Ellsworth experiment was unsuccessful, and drawing initial
plans for a second attempt. A first meeting was held on
10 January at NERC headquarters to discuss the issues
encountered and to agree a time frame over which plans
might be produced. A formal Failure Review Board (FRB) was
convened by NERC, to independently assess the technical
issues that caused the experiment to be halted, and to make
recommendations on their mitigation. A series of reports
were submitted to this review by the Lake Ellsworth team on
29 March, including a drill report and an overarching
programme report, each providing technical suggestions
relating to how the programme could be restarted. The
review itself was convened between 13 and 14 May in
London, involving a full day of interviews and presentations
by members of the scientific and technical teams, followed
by discussion and report writing. The FRB’s official review
was provided to the Lake Ellsworth team on 24 June.
5. PI’S DRILLING FAILURE REPORT
As part of the documentation made available to the FRB, a PI
summary (including a diary of events; see Section 3) was
submitted, which highlighted areas in which failures oc-
curred, and how they might be solved. While the formal drill
and programme reports, and indeed the FRB’s report, cannot
be reproduced here, their content is broadly in line with the
abridged extracts selected below from the PI’s summary, in
addition to recommendations discussed in Section 6.
Drilling to Lake Ellsworth was halted as a consequence of
the failure to connect the main drillhole to a subsurface
cavity. The length of time taken to try to reach the cavity
(40 hours; 20 hours to reach the cavity depth and 20hours
to try and connect to it), in addition to previous delays due to
difficulties with the drill system, meant that as a consequence
of unplanned fuel consumption, insufficient fuel was
available to complete the hole even if the cavity link was
subsequently achieved. Further, the umbilical became frozen
into the ice sheet, making it impossible for the borehole
pump (which worked well throughout) to recover water from
the subsurface reservoir, and thus continue deep drilling.
These explanations are summarized in Table 1, alongside
their potential mitigation/removal. Three options are then
offered (which are non-mutually exclusive) on how to
reconfigure the drilling equipment and operation in order
to successfully access the lake. Other areas of the experiment
requiring attention to reduce risk at a second attempt but
which did not cause the drilling failure are also provided.
Option 1 involves repairing the existing equipment and
repeating the same experiment. The changes outlined in
Table 2 would allow the Lake Ellsworth experiment to be
undertaken with considerably reduced risk of repeat failure.
This is done by concentrating on solutions to the problems
outlined in the assessment of drilling failure (Table 1). This
option represents a way in which the drilling may restart
with only moderate modifications to the equipment, and no
modification to the experiment itself. In summary, it will
require:
Repairs/replacements to some of the equipment (sensor
system, boiler, umbilical hose and reeler, main hose
reeler);
Detailed calculations of the drilling process, which are
not allowed to change subsequently;
Additional expertise and spares on site (in total, 4 drill
engineers, 1 lead drill engineer, 1 boiler engineer,
1 electrical engineer).
Option 2 involves two additional modifications to the
Lake Ellsworth experiment, highlighted in Table 3, to further
reduce the risk of failure. Both relate to ‘systems tests’ of
equipment prior to the main field experiment. Both would
be challenging and potentially costly in time and resources.
Option 3 is to rethink the experimental design. Whereas
options 1 and 2 allow the Lake Ellsworth exploration
programme to restart with a reduced risk of failure under
the same experimental design, it is worth considering
modifying the experiment to further reduce the risk.
Prior to efforts to redesign elements of the Lake Ellsworth
drill system and plan a return field campaign, the items
detailed in Table 4 comprise essential field logistics and
repairs that are also needed. It should be noted that such
repairs are essential regardless of which of the options listed
in the previous section are adopted.
6. FRB RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROGRAMME
DESIGN AND TECHNOLOGY
After considering the PI summary and recommendations,
and formal reports from the Lake Ellsworth Consortium, and
after discussions following presentations to the FRB, a
45-point list of recommendations was provided to the
programme as an independent assessment of the problems
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encountered in the field season, and how these can be
mitigated in future work.
The report also commended several aspects of the
programme, including the CEE, the design and delivery of
the hot-water drill system, the probe design and deployment
system, cleanliness protocols, logistics management, the
formal risk assessment, the programme’s media and public
relations work, the project management and the fact that
important lessons that could be learned by the programme
were now available.
The FRB’s 45 recommendations covered the following
eight areas: linking the main borehole to the subsurface
cavity; fuel availability; umbilical hose freezing; borehole
cavity modelling; management and staffing; drill safety
systems; hot-water drill subsystems; and risk assessment. The
most important of these recommendations – the critical
issues that if solved would result in a successful mission –
are provided below.
In relation to linking the main borehole to the subsurface
water cavity, the FRB made the following recommendations:
Reassurance of the strength of a 300m dry hole was
needed through mechanical modelling of the ice.
A more rigorous method involving thermal fluid dynam-
ics modelling of the cavity formation, and the use of
keyhole techniques to build the cavity, should be used to
add confidence in its likely dimensions. Field data from
the 2012/13 season should be used to understand the
dimensions of the cavity that was built, which could help
to explain why it was not linked by the main borehole.
Verticality of the boreholes should be assured if sub-
surface cavity linkage is to occur, and techniques that
would add confidence to demonstrating this in the field
should be investigated.
Table 1. Summary of items responsible for drilling failure and their solutions
Incident Failed items Significance Proposed resolution
Failure to link the
main hose to the
cavity
Reeler load cells not working. Unable to know precisely when the hose
was bottoming out in the hole, resulting in
bent drill head and tilt/loss of plumb line
and hence likely off-vertical hole created.
[By providing information to the driller to
ensure the hose does not bottom out in the
hole, and therefore that it hangs as a plumb
line, the load cells allow gravity-controlled
(vertical) drilling]
Failure analysis.
Redesign/replacement load cells.
Reeler pay-out rate not
controlled satisfactorily.
Unable to lower the drill head at required speed.
Control of hole diameter and bottoming-out poor
(see above). [Controlling the pay-out allows the
driller to ensure the drill head is above the hole
floor]
Engineering solution required,
and testing in comparable
environment.
Drilling information not available
in required location, due to parts
failure and electrical interference.
The drilling was essentially undertaken ‘blindly’
as specific information on drill speeds and
load information was absent, and borehole
temperatures and water levels were not
available as needed. Control of hole
diameter and bottoming-out poor (see above).
Redesign and fully test the sensor
system with full drill system or
analogue in a comparable
environment, to ensure reliability.
Electrical engineer needed on
site, to assist with on-site
sensor operation.
Drilling calculations on the shape
of the cavity incorrect.
A ‘bulbous’/teardrop, cavity shape was
envisaged to have been built. If it was
thinner than calculated by the drill
consultant, this may have contributed
(or led) to failure to link the main hose.
Revise calculations (numerical
modelling) of how the water
cavity forms in deep ice.
Insufficient fuel
to continue
operations
Fuel consumption different in the
field compared with planned usage.
Whereas sufficient fuel was purchased to
drill 2 holes, last-minute changes to the
drilling meant that fuel contingency was less
than planned originally.
Form a firm plan for drilling operations
based on best available models/data
prior to purchase of fuel.
Delays and poor burner efficiency
and therefore additional fuel use,
due to boiler problems.
Fuel contingency was used, keeping the
boiler and camp ‘ticking over’ while
technicalities were resolved. Several
boiler issues were encountered, and while
by the end of the fieldwork it was working
at the level required, its reliability is
questionable given these issues.
Analysis, redesign/servicing and
testing of the boiler in comparable
environment is needed. Boiler engineer
needed on site, to resolve boiler issues
as soon as possible, and to ensure it is
working as needed by the drillers.
Umbilical hose
freezing-in
Failure to understand the significance
of water with very low temperature
being returned by the umbilical pump,
and apparent initial balance between
the main-hose water use and water
returned by the umbilical pump.
Cold water from the main hose was
probably overtopping within the firn, and
wicking down the umbilical hose, thus
freezing it in.
Improved models and training for
drilling procedure need to be widely
communicated to personnel on site.
Senior hot-water driller needed on site,
to oversee drilling. Additional drillers
needed to share the load, especially
when on 24 hour operations.
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Various hardware issues encountered in the field require
remedies that prevent reoccurrence. These involve (1) the
load cells, which are essential for ensuring verticality of the
borehole, (2) reeler speed resolution, which needs to be
controlled precisely at low levels, (3) drill-nozzle extensions,
which need to be more robust and fit for purpose, (4) sensor
noise issues, both in terms of spare parts being available in
the field and the reduction in electrical noise, (5) efficiency
and safety in surface water generation, which should include
a mechanical front-end loader for shovelling snow, (6) better
definition and clarity in the drilling strategy, and (7) testing
the hose to quantify elongation when filled with hot water
and stretched.
Concerning the lack of fuel available on site, the FRB
recommended that fuel contingency should be increased by
bringing more fuel on site and by improving system fuel
efficiencies by increasing the hot-water system’s thermal
capacity, adding heat recovery to the generators and
adapting a rigorous fuel log to track consumption. It also
recommended that increased drilling speeds would assist
fuel use, and this could be achieved by replacing the
standard cavity pump motor with a high-temperature motor
that has fewer restrictions of use during cavity drilling and
reaming; reassessing the optimal length of the drill nozzle;
and using a forward-only spray configuration when building
the hole.
Table 2. How to repair the existing equipment to allow a second drilling attempt
Problem Proposed solution Consequence Difficulty:
1 easy–
5 difficult
Reeler load cells Replace and test load cells, and ensure that
appropriate expertise is on site for installation.
Specification of load cells to be recalculated to
ensure sensitivity at the level required.
Drillers would know when the drill starts to
‘bottom out’ in the drillhole; avoiding this
ensures the hole remains vertical.
1
Reeler pay-out rate
not controlled
satisfactorily
Reelers need to have automated speed control and
new gear ratio(s) added then tested. A possible
solution is to swap the motors from hydraulic to
electric.
Drillers can control the descent of the drill head
more accurately, thus ensuring the hole is
drilled vertically.
2
Drilling information
not available in
required location
Redesign and fully test the sensor system with full drill
system or analogue in a comparable environment, to
ensure reliability. Electrical engineer needed on site,
to assist with on-site sensor operation.
Drillers have full information readily available,
which, in conjunction with the above changes,
adds confidence in the ability to drill a vertical
hole. If both the umbilical and main drillholes
are drilled vertically, the risk of not linking the
main drillhole to the cavity is reduced.
2
Ensuring sufficient fuel
on site to complete
2 holes
Form a firm plan for drilling operations based on
best available models/data, and do not change
it subsequently.
Appropriate fuel is purchased and used,
ensuring contingency and allowing proper
fuel budgets to be calculated on site.
3
Ensuring boiler
performance
Analysis, redesign/servicing and testing of the boiler
in comparable environment is needed. Have
necessary spares and expertise (boiler engineer)
on site.
Starting the drilling itself only when the boiler
is working fully.
3
Cold water from the
main hose overtopping
within the firn, and
wicking down the
umbilical hose
Improved models and training for drilling procedure
need to be widely communicated to personnel on
site. Senior hot-water driller needed on site, to
oversee drilling. Additional drillers (4 in total,
in addition to senior driller) needed to share the
load, especially when on 24hour operations.
Drilling operations are fully monitored and
problems predicted before they become serious.
2
Umbilical hose
replacement
A new umbilical hose is needed. In the
replacement, a borehole pump capable of
working with water temperatures >408C is necessary.
Ensures drilling the cavity is possible, and with
hotter water will also contribute to ensuring
verticality of the hole.
2
Table 3. System tests that would help reduce risk of failure
Problem Proposed solution Consequence Difficulty:
1 easy–
5 difficult
Reducing operational risk
in drilling
Full system test of drill equipment, preferably
in a polar environment.
Drillers gain experience of the full system, and
problem-solve issues prior to main experiment.
4
Reducing operational risk
in probe/corer deployment
Undertake deep-sea trials or rigorous
analogue tests* of probe and corers.
Ensure the instruments work as integrated units within
appropriate conditions. Equipment would need to be
re-cleaned and bagged afterwards, but this is needed
in any case prior to a second attempt.
4
*This could be done in a large temperature-controlled pressure vessel and with a temperature-controlled shipping container. This has advantages over sea trials
(e.g. easy repetition, repair, cost per test) but has a capital cost.
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In terms of the freezing-in of the umbilical hose, the FRB
agreed with the engineer’s assessment that it was caused by
wicking of water from the main borehole down the
umbilical, where it froze midway between the surface and
the cavity. Though not mentioned in the FRB’s report, this
was a single point of failure, regardless of whether the cavity
was linked, as without being able to free the umbilical the
submersible pump would have been unable to access the
water created beneath. Hence, avoiding this reoccurring is
essential to future success. The FRB made recommendations
that would reduce the risks. These included the following:
Explore alternative procedures for creating and confirm-
ing the main link between the main borehole and cavity.
These included using the umbilical hose to drill the main
borehole to 300m, keeping it dry once below 70m from
the ice surface; and developing a small cavity at 70m, to
soak up excess from the main borehole.
Keep the umbilical moving while the main borehole is
being built to avoid sticking.
Other recommendations focused on keeping the experiment
running if the umbilical hose became stuck. These included
aiming to create a cavity shape that is shallow and wide, by
adjusting the nozzle spray direction once at the ice depth
required, as it would allow the bulk of subsurface water to
be accessed by the pump, even if it were frozen stuck; and
determining a back-up plan for when the umbilical hose
becomes stuck.
On the matter of borehole and cavity modelling, the FRB
recommended using a new approach to characterization of
the cavity shape, and that this should be discussed by other
glaciologists and drillers. Use of dynamic thermal model-
ling was suggested, in which melting efficiency and freeze
rates are model outputs rather than inputs based on
experience/empirical data. Once this modelling has been
undertaken, the drilling strategy should be rewritten, to
include a set of tools (i.e. calculations, charts, tables) that
would be used to guide the field team responsible for
implementing the strategy.
Concerning staffing and expertise, the FRB agreed with
the programme’s self-assessment, that additional personnel
were needed on site. Specific recommendations included
the following:
External drilling experts should be engaged in the
redesign of the drill. An experienced senior hot-water
drilling engineer should also be involved in both drill
development and deployed into the field.
An external drill design review should be configured, to
offer advice on design and to verify implementation. A
formal readiness review should also be commissioned
before deployment to the field.
Sufficient expertise is needed in the field, including a
senior hot-water driller and three drillers per shift.
Additional expertise to cover electronics, generators
and boilers is also necessary.
A number of recommendations were provided concerning
safety systems, especially the deployment of emergency stop
buttons and cords in strategic locations around the field site,
the installation of load circuit interrupters on all heat trace
elements, and integral temperature/flow safety limits within
the boiler.
Table 4. Essential repairs to equipment
Item Repairs/changes needed Logistics needed Result
Boiler A full service of the boiler is required, with
special attention being paid to known issues
(e.g. pressurization sensors, pressurization pumps,
valves, heat trace, and control boards).
Maintenance on the boiler is
best undertaken in the UK, by
the manufacturer.
A fully serviced boiler, upgraded
to cope with wintering and fully
assessed with respect to its
capability and suitability for
drilling a deep borehole in
Antarctica.
Umbilical
reeler and hose
A new umbilical hose and pump is required.
Ideally, the pump needs to be capable of working
at temperatures >408C (preferably 908C). The
winch system needs to be modified to cope with
precise slow pay-out at low temperatures.
Load-cell and pay-out information needs to be
guaranteed at the driller’s position.
The umbilical container needs
to be removed from Antarctica
and sent back to the UK.
An umbilical hose/drill capable
of drilling a vertical hole and
creating a cavity, with low risk
of failure.
Main reeler
and hose
The winch system needs to be modified to cope
with precise slow pay-out at low temperatures.
Potentially a new hose may be needed, depending
on how it has survived with ice inside. Load-cell
and pay-out information needs to be guaranteed
at the driller’s position. The main-drill reeler
scrolling gear needs to be re-engineered/adjusted
– it required manual intervention in 2012/13,
which would cause unacceptable delays on
withdrawing >3 km.
The main hose currently has water
(ice) within it. This needs to be
heated and blown through. The
condition of the hose then needs to
be assessed. The main drill container
needs to be removed from Antarctica
and sent back to the UK. Re-engin-
eering/adjustment of scroll gear and
testing (possible in UK and else-
where).
A main hose/drill capable of
drilling a vertical hole and
creating a cavity that can be
withdrawn rapidly with low
risk of failure.
Drill head
extensions
Drill-head extensions bent on deployment, due
to bottoming-out in the main hole. While event
can be mitigated by redesign of load cells and
pay-outs, it can also be aided potentially by
redesign of the head and/or choosing a different
material from brass, possibly titanium, which is stronger.
Model drill-head design options,
investigate the use of titanium/other
materials for drill-head extensions.
Drill-head designs that are
not so easily bent as those
used previously.
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Concerning the hot-water drill subsystems, the FRB’s
report included these recommendations:
Use of a single boiler represents a potential single point
of failure. Multiple boilers should be considered to
reduce this risk, albeit with an appreciation that more
maintenance may be needed.
Given the reelers were difficult to control, converting
their drives from hydraulic to electrical could solve many
of the issues reported from the field.
Non-shielded signal cables should be shielded against
noise, to guarantee sensor information at the driller’s
location. Also, the use of wireless data transmission
could be considered to further reduce electrical noise
issues.
A down-hole camera should be used to confirm hole
integrity and dimensions.
The FRB commended the programme’s use of a formal risk
assessment, and in particular the Markov chain approach
used to understand risk in both the drill and probe (Brito and
others, 2012a). However, the FRB noted that quantitative
data for the drill were obtained by only one expert from the
programme, with others in the programme offering com-
ments. A more defendable dataset could be built by gaining
input from colleagues outside the programme. Manufac-
turer’s data were used as input to the risk model on many
occasions. The FRB recommended testing components to
form an independent evaluation of performance rather than
relying on manufacturers’ information. Finally, to ascertain
whether the project has undue risk, a comparison of the
quantified risks for Lake Ellsworth should be compared with
those (presently unquantified) for the successful WISSARD
(Whillans Ice Stream Subglacial Access Research Drilling)
and IceCube (South Pole) drills.
7. LAKE ELLSWORTH DRILL REPORT
The bulk of the critical recommendations made by the FRB
concerned the hot-water drill and related systems. Because
of this, engineers at BAS, responsible for the design,
development and deployment of the drill system, compiled
a formal report on the modifications needed on the drill in
response to the FRB recommendations. A draft response was
presented to the 7th International Workshop on Ice Drilling
Technology (Hill and Lake Ellsworth Consortium, 2013), and
feedback from this meeting was used to clarify a number of
points in the final report, which was led by David Blake at
BAS. In addition, commercial drilling experts were invited to
a meeting held at BAS on 9 October 2013, to discuss
existing technical solutions to various drilling problems, and
to ascertain the feasibility of importing them to use in
Antarctic hot-water drilling. Again, feedback from this
meeting was used in the BAS-led drill report.
The drill report proposed resolutions to issues highlighted
by the FRB in terms of faults being either primary (initiating a
problem) or secondary (deriving from, and adding to, a
problem). An example of a primary fault is the faulty load
cells, which meant drill-head bottoming in the drillhole
could not be identified. This issue led to bending of the drill
extension nozzle, which itself is thus a secondary fault. The
report also responded to all the recommendations of the
FRB, the vast majority of which were accepted.
Of the issues that were not accepted (yet), the use of
hydraulics to run the reelers was questioned as an effective
hydraulic system. In fact such a system was used effectively
in the field for the Lake Ellsworth probe deployment system.
This power unit was able to provide lowering speeds down
to mms–1, which is well within the range required by the
hot-water drill. Such a system could be used to drive the
hose reelers. This is not to say that an electrical system will
not be considered further, but the use of hydraulics should
not be ruled out at this stage.
A second issue that required resolving following FRB
concerns related to the mechanical strength of a dry
borehole down to 300m depth, the issue being that it may
close due to creep of ice during the experiment. This is not
considered to be a significant problem, however, as the work
of Gow (1963) on the 309m deep Byrd ice-cored hole
demonstrated closure of only 20mm over 12 months.
Hence, the mechanical integrity of a dry borehole at
300m is likely to be sufficient for the short-term (<10 days)
purposes required at Lake Ellsworth.
A third point concerned adding confidence to knowing
hole verticality. A simple dead-reckoning system is used at
South Pole to demonstrate sufficient ‘hole verticality’, using
motion sensors (tiltmeters and a compass) at the drill head.
At Lake Ellsworth, a similar system could either be deployed
as drilling takes place, or subsequently to measure the hole
prior to probe deployment as a discrete operation.
Fourth, the recommendation concerning investigating
how to free a frozen hose was not accepted. Once frozen,
it is already too late to get hoses out. Instead, the
recommendation that the hoses be continually monitored
for their state of health in the borehole was accepted as the
best means to avoid freezing the hose within the ice sheet.
Fifth, the FRB recommended investigating alternative
procedures for creating and confirming the link between the
cavity and main hose. While this was accepted, it is not yet
clear exactly which of several alternative drilling procedures
is most preferable. For example, the actual need to link the
cavity and main borehole is the most important issue at this
stage. It may well be that a procedure that does not require
such a link can be designed, involving two separate holes
(one for water creation and storage and one for the main
hole), although its own separate risks must then be
considered. Further discussion is ongoing, but the point that
the drilling procedure should be modified to lower the risk
of drilling failure is well made.
8. PATHWAY FOR THE LAKE ELLSWORTH
PROGRAMME
While the various reports and responses, discussed above,
demonstrate that considerable development of the hot-water
drill is needed to ensure the future successful exploration of
Lake Ellsworth, they also show that the problems encoun-
tered are tractable. While considerable effort is needed to
upgrade and test the drill to a satisfactory level, the reports
provide confidence that the mission remains feasible. The
main issue relates to ensuring the subsurface cavity link to
the main borehole. Either a failsafe procedure needs to be
developed, which should involve borehole verticality
assurance and knowledge of the size, shape and location
of the cavity, or this element of the drilling should be
eliminated. By not needing to link a subsurface cavity, a
single point of failure would be removed. In doing so, other
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risks may be introduced, however. In the absence of a cavity
link, engineering solutions are needed on the creation and
storage of sufficient water for deep-ice drilling; the pumping
of water within the main borehole from below the per-
meable firn layer to avoid water loss; and the extraction of
300m of borehole fluid prior to lake entry to avoid
borehole fluid entering the lake. In this situation, it is likely
that a borehole pump will need to be deployed in the same
hole as the main hose, which would potentially lead to
tangling of the hoses. Also, without a linked cavity, it may be
difficult to ensure circulation of all the subsurface water,
which could lead to reduced water temperature in key
places and freezing of the borehole.
The issue of whether or not to attempt a subsurface cavity
link during a second attempt to explore the lake is clearly
central to determining the future pathway for the pro-
gramme. An engineering assessment is required, in order to
establish feasibility of the options available and, from this, a
preferred approach. It is clear to programme members that a
second attempt to explore the lake cannot take place until a
reliable deep-ice drill has been developed. This is an
engineering, rather than a scientific, issue and may require
several years of work. Hence, the next step for the
programme is to concentrate on developing and testing a
deep-ice drill before a return mission to the lake can be
proposed. The scientific hypotheses relating to subglacial
lake exploration remain compelling, and Lake Ellsworth
remains an ideal target to test them.
9. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Despite having been planned for >10 years, attempts to
access Subglacial Lake Ellsworth 3 km beneath the surface of
the West Antarctic ice sheet using a bespoke hot-water
drilling system were unsuccessful in December 2012. The
main reason for the failure relates to a subsurface cavity of
water 300m beneath the ice surface that could not be
connected to by the main drillhole, and which consequently
resulted in insufficient water available to continue drilling
deeper. To explain why the connection was not made, it is
highly likely that one or both drillholes were drilled non-
vertically, leading to an enhanced offset at 300m. Evidence
for this comes from drill-nozzle extensions, which were bent
as a consequence of grounding the drill head on the base of
the hole. This situation was caused by a series of equipment
problems, including load-cell failures on both hose reelers
(which would have instructed when drill ‘bottoming’ was
occurring), reeler pay-out rates being difficult to control, and
a lack of information readily available to the drillers. The
situation was made worse by the initial poor performance of
the boiler, which meant drilling speeds could not be as high
as planned, and eventually a lack of fuel to continue.
Further, but separate from equipment issues, the experiment
design in which two drillholes were separated by only 2m
led to exchange of water between them at the base of the
firn layer (at 60m depth), which caused wicking of cold
water down the cavity drillhole and the eventual freezing-in
of the hose within it.
On return to the UK, the Lake Ellsworth team undertook a
self-evaluation of the drilling failure, which was fed into an
independent review of the programme, which in turn made
its own conclusions on why the drilling did not work as
planned and offered recommendations on how the problems
may be mitigated. These recommendations were then
assessed by the Lake Ellsworth team, to form conclusions
on the drilling failure and form a pathway by which the
experiment can be redesigned and restarted.
The likely time frame over which the modifications to the
drilling equipment and procedure may be completed, and
then implemented in a second attempt to explore Lake
Ellsworth, is on the order of 5 years. In 2014, it is hoped that
all the drilling equipment will be returned to the UK. Then,
pending additional funding, work can begin on re-engin-
eering the drill in line with FRB recommendations. This will
likely take another year, and with the necessity for thorough
field testing (and subsequent changes) over a further
24month period, the earliest equipment could be installed
back to the lake would be the 2018/19 season.
Despite the obvious setback that the Lake Ellsworth
programme has experienced, the lessons learnt from the first
attempt to undertake clean direct measurement and sam-
pling of this pristine environment have been well defined.
These problems are tractable, and if their solutions can be
implemented it is highly likely that the next opportunity for
exploration will be more successful. Looking ahead, if we
are to directly explore the vast sub-ice continent of
Antarctica, clean, efficient and rapid access to the subglacial
environment is a necessity. Consequently, the satisfactory
redesign of the Lake Ellsworth hot-water drill will be of value
not only for the exploration of this lake, but to a broad range
of future Antarctic exploratory research in the decades
ahead.
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